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Brexit: Should the UK Leave the EU?
About this report and VoteWatch Europe
There are, of course, many dimensions to the question of whether the UK should leave the EU. One question 
that has arisen during the debate in the UK in the countdown to the referendum on 23 June is whether the 
UK has become isolated in EU policy-making: in the Council and European Parliament. 
Similarly, from the perspective of the rest of the EU, what might be the policy implications for the EU as a 
whole be if the UK left the EU? With our dataset on voting in the European Parliament and Council of the EU, 
VoteWatch is uniquely placed to provide some answers to these questions.
This report is divided into three parts. First, we show how often the UK government has been in the minority 
and majority in votes in the Council of the European Union. We also show the member states that the UK 
has voted with most. Second, we turn to the European Parliament and look at whether British MEPs are 
marginalised in decision-making in that institution. Third, we repeat a simulation we undertook in January 
2016 based on our voting data to analyse the top five likely effects of Brexit for EU policy outcomes.
Our analysis covers the years since 2004 and builds on the extensive dataset behind VoteWatch Europe’s 
online reporting. Details about individual votes, broader trends within policy areas, or other further 
elaborations of the results in this report can be found on our website: www.votewatch.eu. 
With special thanks to Burson-Marsteller for helping us to publish this report. 
Simon Hix is the Harold Laski Professor of Political Science at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science, a Senior Fellow on the ESRC’s UK in a Changing Europe programme, and Chairman of VoteWatch.
Sara Hagemann is Assistant Professor at London School of Economics and Political Science, a Senior Fellow of the 
ESRC’s Impact Accelerator Programme and co-founder of VoteWatch.
Doru Frantescu is director and co-founder of VoteWatch, EU affairs and strategic (digital) communications expert.
SIMON HIX DORU FRANTESCUSARA HAGEMANN
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Main findings
• The UK is the most outvoted Member State in the EU Council. However, it has supported more than 
97% of the EU laws adopted in the last 12 years;
• British opposition to EU policies occurred especially on budget, foreign policy and foreign aid issues. 
Nevertheless, the UK was not the most oppositional government on several important issue areas: 
internal market, legal affairs, transport, environment, and fisheries;
• Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark are the UK’s closest allies in the EU Council and would lose an 
important partner if Brexit occurred;
• The UK has diminished its influence in the European Parliament in recent years, as a result of self-
distancing of some of its own party delegations from the EU’s mainstream political families, as well as 
due to the results of the latest EU elections in the UK;
• Nevertheless, UK MEPs have captured many powerful agenda-setting positions, such as 
rapporteurships of key EU legislation and EP committee chairmanships;
• The main losers of Brexit among EU stakeholders are those that promote less regulatory burden for EU 
businesses and stronger protection of copyright;
• Brexit would also push the remaining EU governments to pay more to the EU. 
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Figure 2 further elaborates on the recorded opposition in the Council as it shows the percentage of times 
each EU government has been in a losing “minority” in Council votes, as a proportion of all votes it took part 
in in the 2004-2009 and 2009-2015 periods. 
Two things are immediately striking.  First, there was a big increase in the level of conflict in the Council 
between 2004-09 and 2009-15, with many more governments voting No or Abstaining in the latter period 
than in the former period.  Second, the UK government was on the losing side a far higher proportion of 
times than any other EU government in the 2009-15 period: jumping from being on the minority (losing) 
side only 2.6% of the time in 2004-09 to being on the minority (losing) side 12.3% of the time in the 2009-15 
period.  Also, the next most frequent “losing” governments, Germany and Austria, were only on the minority 
side 5.4% of the time in this period.
One thing to note, though, is the very high level of agreement in the Council in both periods.  Put the other 
way round, the UK voted on the winning side 97.4% of the time in 2004-09 period and 86.7% of the time in 
the 2009-15 period.
The UK in the Council
Decision-making in the Council has changed quite markedly during the past ten years. In particular, the 
2004 enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty and changes to the 
internal rules of procedures in 2009 have led to significant changes. These include, amongst other issues, 
1) an increase in the percentage of legislation co-decided with the European Parliament under the Ordinary 
Legislative Procedure (OLP);
2) an increase in the formal recording of governments’ agreements in the Council; and
3) steps towards making the Council’s legislative records available to the public. 
In practice, however, many Council decisions are agreed by “consensus”, meaning that member state 
representatives work together to seek an agreement that all countries will be able to support. As a result, 
most votes are recorded with either no or only few countries abstaining or opposing legislation. Yet, as 
both No votes and Abstentions work against the majority to support a proposal, we consider both those 
expressions as ‘opposition’ in our figures below. 
Figure 1 shows the Council’s legislative activities since 2004. 
The UK in the Council
Figure 1: Legislation agreed in the EU Council, 2004-2015
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Table 1 below the figure further elaborates on the distribution of these votes by the UK governments since 
2004. 
Table 1: UK Votes in the Council 2004-15
Figure 2: Percentage  of times a member state was in the minority in the EU Council, 2004-15
YEAR YES NO ABSTAIN OPT-OUT
2004 198 1 3 0
2005 119 1 2 0
2006 198 1 2 0
2007 135 5 2 0
2008 213 3 3 0
2009 211 4 6 0
2010 96 1 11 3
2011 86 4 7 9
2012 77 7 2 2
2013 118 9 8 9
2014 156 4 5 0
2015 66 7 6 3
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Who votes together with the UK?
Digging a bit further into the 2009-15 data, we can look at which other governments most frequently 
voted with the UK.  This is shown in Figure 3.  The UK’s main allies in this period were some of its Northern 
European neighbours – Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark – while the German government was least 
likely to vote the same way as the UK. Meanwhile, perhaps surprisingly, in this period the UK government 
voted more frequently with the French government than the Irish government.
Votes by policy area in 2009-15
These aggregate patterns might be distorted by the fact that there were more votes on some policy issues 
than on others, and perhaps the UK was more likely to be on the opposition side in particular areas.  To 
investigate this we can break the 2009-15 votes down by policy area, for all areas where at least ten votes 
were recorded.  As Figure 4 shows, the UK voted against the majority more frequently on budgetary policies, 
foreign and security policy, and international development, and voted with the majority more frequently 
on international trade, industry, environment, transport, legal affairs, economic and monetary union, and 
internal market policies.  In most policy areas, the UK was again the member state most likely to vote against 
the majority, and significantly more likely than the average government in the EU.  Nevertheless, the UK 
was not the most oppositional government on several important issue areas: internal market, legal affairs, 
transport, environment, and fisheries.
Figure 3: UK allies, % of votes, 2009-15
Figure 4: Losing side by policy area
The UK in the Council
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The UK in the European Parliament
MEP Voting Behaviour
Turning to the European Parliament, how influential have British MEPs been since 2004?  To start with, 
Figure 5 shows the percentage of times each member state’s MEPs were on the ‘winning side’ in all votes 
in EP6, EP7 and EP8.  The first thing to note is that the average is high: about 85 per cent.  This is because 
many votes are highly consensual.  Nevertheless, there is significant variation across countries: from 93 per 
cent for Finnish MEPs (and even higher for Bulgarian and Romanian MEPs, who joined in 2007), to only 71% 
for British MEPs.  Also, while British MEPs were reasonably successful in EP6, since 2009 they have been 
less likely to be on the winning side than the MEPs from any other member state.
A key issue to remember, of course, is that voting in the European Parliament is mainly along political group 
lines rather than national lines.  As a result, what determines whether an MEP is on the winning or losing side 
is which political group she belongs to and whether she follows her group’s voting positions, rather than 
which member state she is from. In addition, because coalitions in the European Parliament tend to form 
along left-right lines, the centrist group in the European Parliament – the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
for Europe (ALDE) – is often pivotal in deciding whether a winning majority is either on the left or on the right. 
As a result, ALDE was on the winning side in votes almost 90 per cent of the time in EP6, EP7 and so far in 
EP8. The two largest groups either side of ALDE – the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Socialists 
and Democrats (S&D) – also play a dominant role (and are on the winning side almost as frequently as 
ALDE), while the political groups further to left – the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) 
and the Greens/European Free Alliance (G/EFA) – and further to the right – the European Conservatives 
and Reformists (ECR), Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), and Europe of Nations and 
Freedoms (ENF) – are significantly less likely to win votes.
Note: A member state’s delegation of MEPs was calculated 
as being on the ‘winning side’ in a vote if the plurality of the 
MEPs from the member state voted the same way as the 
majority of all MEPs in the vote.
Figure 5: Percentage of times a member state’s MEPs are on the winning side in the European Parliament
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The UK in the European Parliament
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The high level of political group cohesion and the dominance of the three centrist groups have had significant 
implications for British MEPs. Of the British MEPs, only the Labour Party (in S&D) and the Liberal Democrats 
(in ALDE) now sit in one of the three dominant groups. The Conservatives left EPP in 2009, to form ECR. 
ECR was on the winning side only 56 per cent of the time in EP7 and has only been on the winning side 
58 per cent so far in EP8. Also, the Eurosceptic groups (IND-DEM/EFD/EFDD) that UKIP has belonged to 
have voted against the majority in most votes since 2004. Furthermore, the UKIP MEPs’ capacity to exert 
influence in the European Parliament is diminished by their very low participation rate in the EP votes: in the 
first year of the current EP term, UKIP’s delegation has had a record low participation rate of just 62.3 per 
cent in EP plenary votes, which places it at the very bottom among all national party delegations in the EU. 
Meanwhile, the G/EFA, where the UK Greens, SNP and Plaid Cymru sit, have won in only 64 per cent of 
votes since 2004. In addition, Labour and Lib Dem MEPs have lost seats while the Conservatives and UKIP 
have won seats. As a result, the number of UK MEPs in the three main groups (EPP, S&D and ALDE) has 
fallen from 31  out  of  75  MEPs (41 per cent) in 2004 to 21  out  of  73 (29 per cent) in 2015. Not surprisingly, 
then, UK MEPs are more marginalised in votes than they were before.
In addition, within their political groups, UK MEPs often vote against their groups’ positions. In 2009-14, 
the Conservatives, who dominated ECR, voted with the group majority in almost every vote. In 2004-09, 
however, when the Conservatives were in the EPP, they only voted with the EPP majority 74 per cent of the 
time.  This raises an intriguing question: to what extent is being the dominant party in a marginalised group 
(ECR) better than being a marginalised party in a dominant group (EPP)? Meanwhile, in 2009-14, Labour 
MEPs often voted against the S&D position, as did UKIP in EFD, and SNP in G/EFA.  Only the Lib Dems and 
Greens were more likely to follow group instructions than the average members of their groups.
The combination of sitting in a marginalised group (ECR and EFDD) plus voting against the position of the 
majority of a group (Labour in S&D) means that UK parties are considerably less likely to be on the winning 
side than other national parties.  The only exception are the UK Liberal Democrats, who were an influential 
party in the pivotal group before they lost all but one of their MEPs in 2014. Interestingly, though, some 
parties from the UK’s allies are also relatively marginalised.  The Swedish Conservatives are less likely to 
win votes than any other major party in the EPP, while the Danish and Swedish Social Democrats are even 
less likely to win votes than Labour. 
 
Overall, European Parliament voting records suggest that the UK is in a weak position in this branch of the 
EU’s legislative system.  Most British MEPs do not sit in the groups that dominate the European Parliament 
agenda. And even when they do sit in these groups – such as the Conservatives in EPP before 2009, and 
Labour in S&D – British MEPs are often opposed to the majority positions of these groups. As a result, British 
MEPs often find themselves on the losing side in key votes.
Key positions in the European Parliament 
As with votes in the Council, the roll-call voting records in the European Parliament do not tell the full story 
of power and influence in this institution.  Another key issue is whether UK MEPs capture some of the key 
positions of power in the European Parliament, such as committee chairs or rapporteurships.  
The European Parliament has two main types of ‘power positions’. First, there are the top offices: the 
Bureau members, the political group leaders, and the chairs of the 22 committees.  The executive Bureau 
comprises the Parliament’s President, the 14 Vice-Presidents (who chair the plenary sessions), and the 
The UK in the European Parliament
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five Quaestors (who look after the welfare of MEPs).  The political group leaders together determine 
the plenary agenda, while the committee chairs shape their committees’ agendas and play a key role in 
legislative negotiations with EU governments and the Commission in their respective policy areas.  These 
top offices are assigned at the beginning of each five-year term and re-assigned half-way through a term.
Second, there are the rapporteurs.  A rapporteur is an MEP chosen by his or her committee to write a 
report on a piece of legislation, the EU budget or another issue.  The rapporteur shepherds the report 
through the committee and the plenary, and leads any negotiations with the EU governments and the 
Commission.  MEPs and political groups compete for these powerful positions, as a rapporteur can 
usually influence the amendments the European Parliament proposes and hence the eventual shape of 
the EU law – rather like a ‘sponsor’ of a bill in the U.S. Congress.
British MEPs have held several ‘top offices’ since 2004.  Two have been Vice-Presidents (Edward 
McMillan-Scott and Diana Wallis), three have been Quaestors (Jim Nicholson, Bill Newton-Dunn, and 
Catherine Bearder), four have been political group leaders (Graham Watson, Martin Callanan, Nigel 
Farage, and Syed Kamall), and ten have been committees chairs (Giles Chichester, Phillip Whitehead, 
Arlene McCarthy, Neil Parish, Sharon Bowles, Malcolm Harbour, Brian Simpson, Claude Moraes, Vicky 
Ford, and Linda McAvan).  In addition, a British MEP has chaired the powerful Internal Market committee 
continuously since 2004, and in the current Parliament, British MEPs chair three key committees: Internal 
Market and Consumer Protection (Vicky Ford), Civil Liberties and Justice and Home Affairs (Claude 
Moraes), and (International) Development (Linda McAvan).  
But how does this compare to other member states?  One way of assessing this is to compare the 
percentage of MEPs each member state had in each two-and-a-half year period (2004-06, 2007-09, 
2009-11, 2012-14, 2014-16) with the percentage of top offices their MEPs held. In general, since 2004, 
when compared to all member states, the UK has been slightly ‘over-represented’, in that there have 
been a larger proportion of British MEPs in top offices than British MEPs as a proportion of all MEPs. 
Nevertheless, all larger member states win more top offices than smaller member states, even relative to 
their number of MEPs, and the largest member state (Germany) does particularly well. This is because 
when a political group wins a top office, this office almost always goes to an MEP from a larger party 
delegation within the group, which is usually a party from one of the larger member states.  
So, the fairest comparison is between the larger member states.  Compared to the other larger member 
states, the UK is slightly ‘under-represented’ in the top offices in the European Parliament.  The UK won 
more top offices than most other large member states in 2009-11, but fewer top offices than the other 
larger member states in every other period since 2004. 
The UK in the European Parliament
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Figure 6: Over/under representation of rapporteurships
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However, not all rapporteurships are of equal value.  Authoring a report on a piece of legislation where the 
European Parliament has full legislative power is clearly more important than authoring a report on an issue 
on which the Parliament has little power. A slightly different pattern emerges when looking at reports on 
‘co-decision’ dossiers in 2009-14: on all the legislation on which the European Parliament had equal power 
(alongside the 28 member state governments represented in the Council of the European Union) to amend 
and block EU laws.  In this term, when it came to key pieces of EU law, UK MEPs authored more reports than 
the MEPs from every other member state except Germany.
In short, UK MEPs have captured many powerful agenda-setting positions. They have been Vice-Presidents, 
political group leaders, and Chairs of important committees. UK MEPs have also won rapporteurships on key 
legislation, which has enabled them to shape EU law.  Moreover, UK MEPs have not been ‘underrepresented’ 
relative to the MEPs from the other big member states.  And all of this has been possible despite the growing 
number of UKIP MEPs, who have not competed for many key offices or rapporteurships.
The UK in the European Parliament
Turning to rapporteurships, Figure 6 shows the proportion of reports relative to the proportion of MEPs from 
each member state in the 2004-09 and 2009-04 terms.   MEPs from the older member states, including 
the UK, are more likely to win rapporteurships than MEPs from the member states who joined in the 2000s. 
In fact, UK MEPs (co-)authored 224 reports in 2004-09 and 180 in 2009-14.  These included reports on 
important pieces of legislation, such as the EU Directive on Local Loop Unbundling, which liberalised the 
EU internet service-provider market, and on which Nick Clegg MEP was able to shape the policy in a more 
pro-consumer direction.  In general, in terms of report-writing, UK MEPs were ‘overrepresented’ in 2004-
09 and slightly ‘underrepresented’ in 2009-14.
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Effects of Brexit
Effects of Brexit
The findings above show that the dynamics in the EU institutions would change substantially if the UK 
left the EU. Most of the British politicians who play a direct role in the EU Institutions are favourable to 
free market policies. In the Council there are David Cameron’s Conservative ministers. In the European 
Parliament, most of the British MEPs are on the centre-right side of the political spectrum (Conservatives 
in the ECR group, and UKIP in the EFDD group), while the Labour MEPs are much less prone to support 
extensive regulation than their Socialist colleagues from other countries, for example France.
We have run a simulation to see how some of the key decisions made in the European Parliament in 
recent years would have looked like if the British MEPs would not have been there to vote. On the basis 
of that, we can imagine how future EU legislation might look like, if it is made without British MEPs (and 
no other significant factors would emerge). Needless to say, this is not a comprehensive analysis, but it is 
meant to showcase some trends that are likely to develop, based on current facts and figures.
Here is how the structure of the political groups in the European Parliament looks like with and without 
the British MEPs.
Figure 7: Strengths of the European Parliament’s political groups with/without British Members
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Effect 1: more regulatory burden on EU businesses
British politicians are substantially more favourable to reducing red tape than their continental counterparts. 
If they no longer take part in the decisions regarding the internal market, the pressure on the EU decision-
making apparatus to simplify legislation and reduce red-tape would be much weaker. On the contrary, the 
forces that are of the opinion that reducing red tape has a negative impact on labour and environmental 
standards would become stronger and would find it easier to influence the decisions their way.
For instance, in May 2015 nearly all British Members of the Parliament (MEPs), regardless of their political 
family, supported a move to cut red tape. Concretely, they all voted in favour of a paragraph that backed the 
European Commission’s approach to withdraw from the legislative process those bills that are considered 
obsolete or that are suspected to place too much administrative burden on the institutions and businesses 
working across the EU.
The provision was adopted by 412 votes in favour, 258 votes against and 11 abstentions. Without British 
Members, the majority supporting the cut of red-tape would have been definitely smaller: the result of the 
vote would have been 357 in favour, 251 against and 10 abstentions. The smaller the EP majority behind 
a Commission proposal gets, the more the Commission becomes hesitant to change course of policy. 
Notably, within the S&D group the British Labour delegation had a different opinion, voting alongside the 
centre-right in favour of less legislation. The statement was part of an own-initiative EP report dealing with 
green growth opportunities for SMEs.
Similarly, British MEPs from the three main delegations (Conservatives, Labour and UKIP) have traditionally 
supported a more flexible labour market, being of the opinion that this is needed in order to strengthen the 
competitiveness of the European enterprises. They have also voted against the introduction of minimum 
wages across the EU. In the case of Labour MEPs, their positions have sometimes even gone against 
those of their continental colleagues in the Socialist group, such as in the latest EP report titled “Creating a 
competitive EU market for the 21st century”, voted in September 2015.
Effect 2: weaker copyright protection in the EU
In September 2010, the EU Parliament adopted a report titled “Enforcement of intellectual property rights in 
the internal market”. The final shape of this non-legislative resolution was largely in favour of strengthening 
the position of rights holders and called for the introduction of a set of measures to combat IPR  infringements 
in an effective manner. The text was controversial and was approved by a small margin of votes. The 
resolution was adopted by 328 votes in favour to 245 against and 81 abstentions. The MEPs from the two 
main British delegations, Labour and Tories, all voted in favour of the text. Notably, Labour MEPs did so even 
against the line of their Socialist continental counterparts.
In the absence of UK Members the score of the vote back in 2010 would have been 295 votes in favour, 225 
against and 78 abstentions. After the 2014 EU elections the majority supporting stronger copyrights has 
diminished substantially and without the British MEPs it would no longer be a majority at all.
Effects of Brexit
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Effect 3: EU budget as a whole would be smaller, while Member 
States’ contributions would increase
The disputes between Brussels and London on the matter of how much the UK should contribute to the 
common coffer are not news. According to the Treaty, the UK enjoys its famous rebate, which allows it to pay 
less money, proportionally, than the rest of the Member States. Additionally, British politicians try to reduce 
their contribution to the EU also indirectly, by reducing the EU budget as a whole (which would automatically 
reduce British contribution proportionally). Concretely, the British government takes this view in the Council 
every time it has the chance, but so do most British MEPs when voting in the European Parliament.
In the autumn of 2014, the pro-EU political groups were able to push forward a report on the draft EU Budget 
for 2015 that reversed the cuts proposed by the Council. The text was adopted by 464 votes in favour, 186 
against and 46 abstentions. The vast majority of British MEPs from all political families voted against the 
requested increase in the EU budget. Therefore, without the presence of the UK Members, the opposition 
to the budget rise would have been much weaker: 460 votes in favour to 125 against.
The same happened more recently when voting on the resolution addressing the 2016 draft budget. This 
time again, the text welcomed the fact that the draft general budget of the EU for 2016 increased the funding 
in several domains such as security and foreign policy. The text was supported by 422 votes in favour, 173 
against and 85 abstentions. Yet again, British MEPs from all political groups voted against the resolution. 
If they had not taken part in the vote, the result would have been 421 votes in favour, 116 against and 78 
abstentions.
Consequently, in the case of a Brexit, the total EU budget would be certainly smaller without the British 
contribution. On the other hand, the Commission and the Parliament would have bigger chances of pushing 
for bigger contributions from the remaining Member States in the absence of British opposition.
Effect 4: stronger push for tax harmonisation and higher taxation of 
financial transactions
If the British MEPs had not been there to vote, harmonisation of taxation across the EU would have been 
more likely. An illustration of this is the rejection of a call for EU-wide tax harmonisation that took place in 
March 2015.
The Socialist, Liberal-Democrat and Greens/EFA MEPs wanted to adopt a measure calling the EU to put 
forward tax harmonisation measures. The proposal was rejected, by 308 votes in favour to 370 against, 
as most of the centre-right MEPs (EPP and ECR) voted against tax harmonisation. Interestingly, inside the 
Socialist and Democrats group, the British Labour delegation also disagreed with the position expressed by 
their continental counterparts and voted alongside the centre-right. Without the UK Members, the majority 
against the harmonisation of taxation would have been much thinner: 298 votes in favour and 317 against.
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Moreover, if UK MEPs were to leave the EU Parliament, a stronger drive for normalising financial transactions 
would emerge. This can be observed on a vote over a paragraph within the report “EU Semester for 
economic policy coordination for 2015”. On this occasion, a centre-left majority succeeded in pushing for 
an explicit call for the adoption at Council level of an ambitious financial transaction tax (FTT). The provision 
was adopted by 353 votes in favour, 317 against and 27 abstentions. Without the British EU Parliamentarians 
opposing the paragraph, the majority in favour of the regulation of financial transactions would have been 
even stronger.
Effect 5: less support for nuclear and exploitation of unconventional 
energy sources (e.g. shale gas)
Supporters of nuclear energy would lose a strong ally in the EU institutions if the British MEPs were to leave 
the Union. UK members usually oppose provisions demanding the phasing out of nuclear energy. This was 
the case for example when voting on an amendment within the report “EU Energy Security Strategy”. The 
amendment was calling on the Member States and the EU institutions to phase out subsidies and other 
public funding for new and existing nuclear facilities. The call for the phasing out was rejected by 248 votes 
in favour and 419 against. With no UK MEPs, the result of the vote would have been 239 votes in favour and 
360 votes against. In other words, the pro-nuclear camps would become smaller.
Similarly, there would be less backing for exploiting unconventional energy resources such as shale gas. 
Another amendment on the same report asking the Member States “to refrain from any shale gas exploration 
and exploitation activities” was also rejected by 289 votes in favour, 388 against and 25 abstentions. Without 
the British delegation, the outcome of the vote would have been 276 votes in favour, 329 votes against and 
25 abstentions.
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i      Research for this part of the report was conducted in collaboration with Giacomo Benedetto.
ii   These rapporteurships data are from William Daniel, and Steffen Hurka, Michael Kaeding and Lukas 
Obholzer.  See W. Daniels, Career Behaviour and the European Parliament: All Roads Lead through 
Brussels? Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015; and S. Hurka, M. Keading and L. Obholzer ‘Learning on 
the Job? EU Enlargement and the Assignment of (Shadow) Rapporteurships in the European Parliament’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 53, 2015, pp. 1230–1247.
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